


A Formal Approach to Specifying and Verifying Spacecraft Behavior



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Outline


- Motivation
- Existing work
- Approach
- Road ahead

Spacecraft behavior: a loose definition

- Interaction with other systems
- Sequencing of inputs, outputs, and state changes
- System modes and mode changes
- System-level interaction between subsystems

Current practice: subsystem design

- Subsystems are precisely specified through drawings, schematics, and code
- Subsystem designs undergo rigorous analysis



Current practice: spacecraft behavior

- Ambiguous behavior specifications


ACS.REQ.ASF.5 ACE SAFEHOLD MODE TRANSITIONS

Only a ground command or ACE box 8085 processor failure shall transition the ACS out of ACE safehold.

ACS.REQ.SSF.2 SCS SAFEHOLD MODE TRANSITIONS

Only a ground command shall transition the ACS to a higher mode. The ACS shall transition back to ACE safehold either by ground command, SCS microprocessor cold start, or by the ACS failure detection and handling logic.

- Extremely limited design and analysis of behavior



The problem

Without analysis, incorrect system behavior is unlikely to be detected until I&T

Existing work

- NASA has experimented with formalizing behavior
 - Fault-protection verification with PVS [Easterbrook]
 - Promela/SPIN for a variety of verification tasks
 - Fault protection [Feather, Barltrop]
 - Autonomy [Havelund, Smith]
 - Software [Gluck, Visser]
 - Model-based programming with RMPL [Ingham]
- Limited formal modeling on non-NASA programs
 - SACI-1 C&DH fault-tolerance [Mota]
 - Abrixas embedded power controllers [Schlingloff]

Approach

- Use *process algebra* to model spacecraft behavior
- Build simplified models that capture key behavior
- Link models to existing spacecraft terminology
- Create tools to make model-building easier

Communicating Sequential Processes

- *A Process Algebra*

Process = Abstract behavior


Algebra = Operators and axioms

- A language for specifying concurrent behavior
- A language for modelling concurrent systems
- A theory for reasoning about behavior and systems

Is it practical?

- CSP in industry: a few examples
 - INMOS – processor and logic design
 - Qinetiq – fault-tolerant ad hoc wireless networks
 - Praxis High-Integrity Systems – secure e-commerce
 - Daimler Aerospace – fault-tolerant software for ISS

Simple example



```
SC = (InstrIF  
[instr_out ↔ buff_in]  
TlmBoard)  
[instr_cmd ↔ instr_cmd, buff_status ↔ buff_status]  
OBC
```

Example process


Telemetry Board Behavior

- Both stores and transmits data
- Only accepts data if it has room
- Only downlinks if it has data
- Downlinks 1 data item at a time
- Signals changes in status

$$TlmBoard = buff_status!notfull \rightarrow TB(MaxBuff, \langle \rangle)$$
$$TB(N, buff) = (\# buff < N) \ \& \ Store(N, buff) \\ \square \\ (\# buff > 0) \ \& \ Transmit(N, buff)$$
$$Store(N, buff) = buff_in?d \rightarrow \\ \text{if } \# buff == N - 1 \\ \text{then } buff_status!full \rightarrow TB(N, buff \hat{\ } \langle d \rangle) \\ \text{else } buff_status!notfull \rightarrow TB(N, buff \hat{\ } \langle d \rangle)$$
$$Transmit(N, buff) = downlink!head(buff) \rightarrow \\ \text{if } \# buff == N \\ \text{then } buff_status!notfull \rightarrow TB(N, tail(buff)) \\ \text{else } TB(N, tail(buff))$$

Spacecraft behavior: definition revisited

- Function sequences
- Event sequences
- State transitions
- Mode transitions
- Behavior constraints
- Inter-subsystem communication
- Shared states and resources
- Triggering events




Framework for behavior specification

- Combine behavior “components” to specify
 - Simple subsystem and systems behaviors
 - More complex autonomous behaviors
 - Fault responses
- Use COTS tools to verify that
 - Specifications are internally consistent
 - Specified behavior is correct

The road ahead

- Collaboration with Dr. Brandon Eames, Jared Crace, and Joe Graham
 - **Short term:** GUI specification tools (built on GME)
 - **Long-term:** code and FPGA generation from specs



Summary

- Spacecraft system-level design should be as **rigorous** as subsystem-level design
- Our research
 - builds on **industrially-proven** formal methods
 - allows rigorous **system-level specification**
 - aims to make system-level rigor **accessible**